W(h)ither Marriage and Childrearing?

February 20th, 2012 by Joseph M. Knippenberg
Share |

A New York Times article reporting the results of this research brief begins in the following way:

It used to be called illegitimacy. Now it is the new normal. After steadily rising for five decades, the share of children born to unmarried women has crossed a threshold: more than half of births to American women under 30 occur outside marriage.

True enough, but misleading and problematical nonetheless.  To begin with, as the article acknowledges, in 2009, 40% of childbirths occurred outside the context of marriage.  Despite the appallingly high percentage of out-of-wedlock births, the “norm” is still marriage.

To be sure, among younger women the proportion of out-of-wedlock births is much higher—87% for 15-19 year-olds and 62% for 20-24 year-olds.  At and after age 25, the proportion drops significantly—to 34% for 25-29 year-olds and even lower (roughly 20%) for older women.  What’s more, according to the definitive CDC study, the cohort with the highest birthrate is women in their early 30s (97.7 per 1,000, barely more than the 96.3 birthrate for women 25-29).  Women in their late 30s are more likely to have children than teenagers (46.5 to 39.1).  Viewed in this light, the “normal” mother is an older woman more likely than her younger counterpart to be married.

This isn’t to say that we should be celebrating.  The proportion of children born outside marriage has been increasing all too rapidly among all ages and races.  While the birthrate among married women is still significantly higher than among their unmarried counterparts, the latter rate has almost doubled in the past 30 years, while the former has declined by more than 10% over the same period.

There are other revealing ways of looking at the data.  For example, in 2009, 73% of the African-American births were to unmarried women, compared to 53% of those to Hispanic women and 29% to white women.  All those percentages were higher than they had been twenty years earlier.  But lest we regard “our” problem as largely one of race, we should consider the data from this CDC report, from which we learn that in 2007 the percentages of births to unmarried women were significantly higher in the more ethnically homogeneous countries of Iceland, Norway, and Sweden than in the more diverse U.S.  While the problems of the African-American family are well-documented, the Scandinavian examples suggest that social policy and permissive cultural norms can also weaken traditional family structures.

This is a problem for reasons the Times article mentions.

The shift is affecting children’s lives. Researchers have consistently found that children born outside marriage face elevated risks of falling into poverty, failing in school or suffering emotional and behavioral problems….

Reviewing the academic literature, Susan L. Brown of Bowling Green State University recently found that children born to married couples, on average, “experience better education, social, cognitive and behavioral outcomes.”

Children are clearly better off in an intact two-parent household.  And to maintain such a household, there’s no substitute for marriage.  While a majority of out-of-wedlock births to white and Hispanic mothers occur in households with cohabiting parents, these relationships are much less stable than marriage.  According to a study reported in the Times article, two-thirds of them break up by the time the child reaches ten.

People are reluctant to marry, we’re told, because they don’t trust the institution.  But the arrangements they make for themselves don’t exactly improve upon it.

How did we get here?  About that, there’s major disagreement.  Among the arguments cited in the Times are the following:

  • Men are “worth less” (not worthless): the decline in men’s wages has made them less reliable and necessary as breadwinners.  Marriage has declined most among those who are most economically marginal.
  • Government policy makes marriage a bad bargain for some, as there are benefits available to the unmarried than aren’t there for the married.
  • Laws permitting “no-fault” divorce send a cultural signal about the relative lack of importance of marriage.

In a recent blog post, my friend Peter Lawler suggests another set of reasons connected with an imprudent extension of some of the implications of the classical liberal individualism that played a prominent role in the American Founding.

The general thought is that idea of marriage between a man and a woman has to be supplanted with the idea of a marriage between autonomous individuals, who are free to choose how to put together their intimate lives. That redefinition fits with the way marriage has been reconfigured, in general, in a Lockean direction over the last few generations. Divorce has been much easier, adultery less stigmatized, and the connection between marriage and children has become progressively more attenuated. We’re more okay than ever with unmarried women having children, and married people not having them.

If we think of ourselves as “autonomous individuals,” not as men and women made for one another and for family life, then our relationships are likely to be more about self-actualization than about anything else.  Because we don’t “focus on the family,” our relationships suffer, and, with them, the children who we bring into this world.

We have taken a relatively long time to get ourselves into this situation, and there is no easy way out.  Public policy has a limited role to play, as (it seems to me) much of our problem is “cultural” or philosophical.  Perhaps we can begin by not regarding as “normal” something that should trouble us all.

Professions of Faith: A Split Decision?

February 3rd, 2012 by Joseph M. Knippenberg
Share |

We have previously noted in this blog that Christian students have been having “issues” with graduate counseling programs, both here in Georgia (at Augusta State University) and in Michigan (at Eastern Michigan University).  Late last year, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta held against Jennifer Keeton, who had sued Augusta State.  Last month, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s summary judgment against Julea Ward, reviving her suit against EMU.

In both cases, conservative Christian students nearing the end of their graduate counseling programs were required to participate in a counseling practicum.  In both cases, the students indicated that they could not counsel gay students in a way that affirmed their sexual orientations.  Keeton was asked to submit to a remediation plan as a condition of remaining in the program and completing the practicum.  Rather than do so, she filed suit.  Enrolled in the practicum, Ward “asked her faculty supervisor either to refer [a gay] client to another student or to permit her to begin counseling and make a referral if the counseling session turned to relationship issues.”  After requesting the referral (which was granted), she was subjected to a disciplinary hearing and expelled from the program.

Both women lost at the district court level, which wasn’t all that surprising.  Courts are very deferential to the professional and curricular judgments of university faculty and could hardly challenge the institutional desire to have their counseling programs comply with the American Counseling Association’s Code of Ethics.

But at the appellate level, as I noted, Keeton lost and Ward won.  That’s because the facts of the cases and the issues presented were ultimately somewhat different.  Keeton apparently wished to give voice, in counseling situations, to her moral disapproval of homosexuality, an intention that put her squarely at odds with the ACA’s Code of Ethics.  By contrast, Ward sought to avoid a situation where she would either have to express her moral disapproval or say something she did not believe.

The question, in Ward’s case, is whether her strategy of avoidance would keep her in compliance with the ACA’s Code of Ethics.  University officials asserted that it didn’t.  Ward’s attorneys argued that nothing in the Code ruled out such referrals.  The appellate panel agreed:

What exactly did Ward do wrong in making the referral request? If one thing is clear after three years of classes, it is that Ward is acutely aware of her own values. The point of the referral request was to avoid imposing her values on gay and lesbian clients. And the referral request not only respected the diversity of practicum clients, but it also conveyed her willingness to counsel gay and lesbian clients about other issues—all but relationship issues—an attitude confirmed by her equivalent concern about counseling heterosexual clients about extra-marital sex and adultery in a values-affirming way.

This is not to say that Ward should automatically win her case.  Far from it.  But there are, the court says, facts and circumstances that need to be brought before a jury.  There’s evidence—not  conclusive but suggestive—that EMU faculty behaved badly in their treatment of Ward, inventing or bending policies because of their hostility toward Ward’s point of view.  Rather than upholding the summary judgment of the district court, the appellate panel called for a jury trial so that these matters could be sorted out.

It also explicitly distinguished its holding from that of the 11th Circuit panel in Keeton’s case.

At one level, the two decisions look like polar opposites, as a student loses one case and wins the other. But there is less tension, or for that matter even disagreement between the two cases than initially meets the eye. The procedural settings of the two cases differ. In Keeton, the district court made preliminary fact findings after holding a hearing in which both sides introduced evidence in support of their claims….  Not only are there no trial-level fact findings here, but Ward also gets the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences in challenging the summary-judgment decision entered against her.

The two claimants’ theories of constitutional protection also are miles apart.  Keeton insisted on a constitutional right to engage in conversion therapy—that is, if a “client discloses that he is gay, it was her intention to tell the client that his behavior is morally wrong and then try to change the client’s behavior.” . That approach, all agree, violates the ACA code of ethics by imposing a counselor’s values on a client, a form of conduct the university is free to prohibit as part of its curriculum. Instead of insisting on changing her clients, Ward asked only that the university not change her—that it permit her to refer some clients in some settings, an approach the code of ethics appears to permit and that no written school policy prohibits. Nothing in Keeton indicates that Augusta State applied the prohibition on imposing a counselor’s values on the client in anything but an even-handed manner. Not so here, as the code of et ics, counseling norms, even the university’s own practices, seem to permit the one thing Ward sought: a referral.

… While Keeton involved Augusta State’s across-the-board application of an ethical rule that prohibits counselors from imposing their values on clients, today’s case reveals evidence that Eastern Michigan University selectively enforced a no-referral policy against Ward.

This does not mean that I’m totally satisfied with either or both decisions, let alone with the circumstances that gave rise to these conflicts.  The deeper conflicts between religion and the professions remain.

Great Supreme Court Victory for Religious Liberty

January 18th, 2012 by Joseph M. Knippenberg
Share |

On Wednesday, January 11th, the Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision in the Hosanna-Tabor case, about which I blogged some months ago.  Finding for the church, the Court upheld the so-called “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination laws that most appellate courts (except for the one in this case) had crafted from the First Amendment.

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts concluded that both the establishment and free exercise clauses prohibited governments from telling churches and church-related schools who they should hire and retain as ministers:

Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment deci­sion. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By impos­ing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.  According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.

He rejected arguments made by the Obama Administration and plaintiff Cheryl Perich’s attorneys that the First Amendment protected churches against only certain sorts of employment discrimination claims.  While they asserted that First Amendment associational freedoms protected churches as they did other groups, Roberts insisted that religion was different:

We find this position untenable. The right to freedom of association is a right enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike. It follows under the EEOC’s and Perich’s view that the First Amendment analysis should be the same, whether the association in question is the Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a social club…. That result is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives spe­cial solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organiza­tion’s freedom to select its own ministers.

This is a very powerful affirmation of the autonomy of religious groups in the face of the regulatory state.

Justice Roberts also rejected the very crabbed approach taken by the appellate court in determining who counts as a minister.  While he didn’t go as far in his deference to religious organizations’ own claims as did Justice Clarence Thomas in his concurrence, he did contend that the exception was capacious enough to include Cheryl Perich.  In deciding who counts as a minister for the purposes of this exception, a variety of factors have to be taken into account, including (but not limited to) ordination or commissioning and involvement in “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.”  While there is no strict rule for determining who counts as a minister, there is also room for judicial inquiry, albeit not of the sort undertaken by the appellate court, which simply counted the amount of time Perich spent in religious activities.

It is true that her religious duties consumed only 45 minutes of each work­day, and that the rest of her day was devoted to teaching secular subjects. The EEOC regards that as conclusive, contending that any ministerial exception “should be limited to those employees who perform exclusively reli­gious functions.” We cannot accept that view. Indeed, we are unsure whether any such employees exist. The heads of congregations themselves often have a mix of duties, including secular ones such as helping to manage the congregation’s finances, supervising purely secular personnel, and overseeing the upkeep of facilities.

Churches and other religious organizations are special.  The First Amendment religion clauses extend them unique protections.  The Supreme Court resoundingly affirmed that truth in this case.

Now I wish they would revisit their holding in CLS v. Martinez, where a narrow majority held that the University of California’s Hastings College of Law could require its Christian Legal Society chapter to adhere to its non-discrimination rules in establishing the eligibility for offices in the organization.  Here the words of Justice Samuel Alito in his concurrence seem particularly appropriate:

Applying the protection of the First Amendment to roles of religious leadership, worship, ritual, and expression focuses on the objective functions that are important for the autonomy of any religious group, regardless of its beliefs. As we have recognized in a similar context,“[f]orcing a group to accept certain members may impair [its ability] to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.”

To be sure, there’s a difference between compelling a group to hire or retain a “minister” and conditioning its access to certain privileges on its adherence to certain publicly-established nondiscrimination standards.  CLS chapters remain “free” to choose their leaders any way they wish and make them adhere to any religious standards they wish, but if they do so, they have to accept, in effect, second-class citizenship in the law school setting.

The Roberts Court has been very good for religious liberty.  It could have been even better.

A Trade of Deception, Part 1

January 10th, 2012 by Toby Tatum
Share |

During the hustle and bustle of the 2011 Christmas season, you may have missed the latest shocking news from the People’s Republic of China: Over 600 smugglers were arrested for trafficking 178 babies across the country. Click here to watch a video report.

Although motives involved in such a wide-scale operation probably vary, it’s likely that this most recent act isn’t much different than a whole host of similar human rights abuses over the past decade. Sadly, this story seems to be the continuation of an abominable trend across the Land of the Rising Sun: Both children and adults are bought, smuggled, and sold like cargo off a merchant ship. Just as recent as July, another batch of nearly 90 minors was rescued from the clutches of 369 child-trafficking gang members (Source).

Two months earlier, a news story out of Shaoyang, a city in China’s Hunan province, revealed that local enforcers of China’s One Child Policy have confiscated at least 20 children over the past decade. Enforcers then sold these children to Chinese adoption centers for $154 per person, and in turn listed “available” children for overseas adoption at the price of $3,000 each (Source).

The China Center of Adoption reports that the largest number of adopted Chinese Children lives in the U.S., so it is likely that the largest number of once-trafficked children also reside in the U.S. (Source). Adopting families may be falsely led to believe they are simply paying “government fees,” when the grim reality bears that they are unknowingly providing the largest contribution of revenue to a government-run, black market-enabled trade of deception.

In fact, in 2005 local enforcers seized the daughter of Yang Libing and Cao Zhimei, a married couple living in a humble mountain village in the Hunan province. The couple was unable to pay the One Child Policy’s “social support compensation” in the amount of 6,000 yuan (nearly $950), so their daughter, around one year old, was taken and offered for adoption (Source). Little Yang Ling now lives in the U.S. (Source).

In 2010, this sort of disreputable behavior took form in a “mom and pop” black market operation led by a Chinese woman and her 38-year-old son (Source). The prevalence of such an injustice may provoke one to question: Why does this abuse continue to occur? Are the economic incentives so great? Clearly, Chinese government policies that show disrespect for human life, individual rights, and the sanctity of the family are helping to drive the supply of “available” children. But we also can’t ignore the role that the demand for adoptable children plays is in encouraging the abuses we see in China.

It is imperative that U.S. citizens are aware of these circumstances when considering an adoption. The choice to adopt is a noble calling, yet adopting couples must be discerning in reviewing the legitimacy of their individual adoption processes. Although China has been highlighted through this exposé, such injustices are present elsewhere as well. Organizations like China Aid and the Laogai Research Foundation work to inform the public of these issues and provide opportunities for concerned citizens to get involved.

Professions of Faith Revisited

December 22nd, 2011 by Joseph M. Knippenberg
Share |

More than a year ago, Eric and I commented on a couple of cases in which Christian students in state university counseling programs had run afoul of the professional requirements imposed by their departments.

Well, in one of those cases, a three judge panel of the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has spoken, finding that Augusta State University did not violate Jennifer Keeton’s free speech and free exercise rights when it required that she accept a remediation plan that enhanced her sensitivity to the needs of gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered, and questioning (GLBTQ—yes, that’s the acronym people use these days) counselees or face expulsion from her graduate program.

The unanimous opinion and the concurrence by conservative hero William Pryor bear careful examination.  Here’s the first passage worth noting:

As all graduate students in the program, regardless of their personal beliefs, must counsel clients in accordance with the ACA Code of Ethics and ASU’s counseling curriculum, the remediation plan did not single out Keeton for disfavored treatment because of her point of view. All students are taught the ACA’s fundamental principles, including that counselors must support their clients’ welfare, promote their growth, respect their dignity, support their autonomy, and help them pursue their own goals for counseling. Further, ASU’s curriculum requires that all students be competent to work with all populations, and that all students not impose their personal religious values on their clients, whether, for instance, they believe that persons ought to be Christians rather than Muslims, Jews or atheists, or that homosexuality is moral or immoral. As such, ASU’s curriculum and the generally applicable rules of ethical conduct of the profession are not designed to suppress ideas or viewpoints but apply to all regardless of the particular viewpoint the counselor may possess….  Keeton remains free to express disagreement with ASU’s curriculum and the ethical requirements of the ACA, but she cannot block the school’s attempts to ensure that she abides by them if she wishes to participate in the clinical practicum, which involves one-on-one counseling, and graduate from the program.

In other words, the issue is not what she thinks or says in class, but how she is to behave as a professional, when she’s called upon to counsel students.  When it demands that Keeton accept the remediation plan, Augusta State is simply upholding the professional standards of the American Counseling Association.

A second crucial consideration from the Court’s point of view is the fact that when Keeton participates in the counseling practicum—required of all students in the program—she could be perceived as representing and speaking on behalf of the University—just as, presumably, were she to gain employment in a public school setting, she would be speaking on behalf of the school when she acted as a counselor.  In a “school-sponsored expressive activity,” the University is entitled to place limits on the kinds of speech permitted.  What’s more, courts have been and should be careful not to interfere with and second-guess the professional judgments of the educators as they design their curricula.  Connected with this consideration is another:

[W]e find that ASU has a legitimate pedagogical concern in teaching its students to comply with the ACA Code of Ethics. ASU must adopt and follow the ACA Code of Ethics in order to offer an accredited program, and the entire mission of its counseling program is to produce ethical and effective  in accordance with the professional requirements of the ACA.

It is reasonable for the University to wish to offer an accredited program.  The standards it is upholding come from the professional association that does the accrediting.  Those sympathetic with Keeton’s concerns should see that their complaint is really with the ACA and only secondarily with Augusta State.  As I said in my earlier post, the real question here concerns the relationship between the professions and people of faith.

In closing this part of its opinion, the appellate panel reminds us that when the state funds a program, it needn’t fund all possible means of accomplishing a legitimate end:

In Rust v. Sullivan…, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution , selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” The program in Rust sought to promote the establishment and operation of family planning projects….  To this end, it funded entities that engaged in family planning counseling, but prohibited fund recipients from giving patients abortion-related advice….  ASU’s clinical practicum is similar to the program in Rust, as it seeks to promote counseling “activities that it believes to be in the public interest.”…. The defined limits of the clinical practicum require students to provide counseling in accordance with ACA Code of Ethics….

If Keeton’s free speech rights trump the University’s interest in this case, then it’s not clear why the similar rights of Planned Parenthood employees wouldn’t trump government concerns in cases where they are, for example, compelled to speak about alternatives to abortion or to show the patient an ultrasound image of her child.

Judge Pryor’s concurrence emphasizes that while the University is on solid ground when it ties its remediation plan to Keeton’s participation in the counseling practicum, it started off much more shakily, seeming to impose the plan simply because she expressed disfavored viewpoints in classes.

[W]e have never ruled that a public university can discriminate against student speech based on the concern that the student might, in a variety of other circumstances, express views at odds with the preferred viewpoints of the university. Our precedents roundly reject prior restraints in the public school setting.

As Judge Pryor reminds his brethren (and us), students in public universities are entitled to disagree with the “preferred viewpoints of the university” in classroom and other settings where they are speaking for themselves and not for the institution.  Citing a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the ability of school authorities to censor a student newspaper, Judge Pryor continues:

The decision of the Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier… is instructive. In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court determined that public schools may regulate school-sponsored speech that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school when the regulation is reasonably related to pedagogical concerns….

Hazelwood does not suggest that Augusta State can discriminate against Keeton’s speech because it will someday confer a degree upon her. Nor does Hazelwood permit a public university to retaliate against student speech whenever it occurs in a classroom. And Hazelwood does not allow retaliation against disfavored speech that occurs outside the classroom.

This is a strong reminder that the professions and the public universities that uphold and enforce their “professional viewpoints” still have to answer to First Amendment concerns.  We all gain when people are free in academic settings to speak their minds.  To be sure, we have to remember that there’s a difference between an academic setting and a professional or clinical setting.  This is the lesson that—at their best—the Augusta State faculty were trying to teach Jennifer Keeton.  It’s one that they should also remember in their conduct as teachers and scholars.

I Have a Bone to Pick with Dino Dan

December 15th, 2011 by Eric Cochling
Share |

Before I rip into Dino Dan, a show on Nick Jr. about an elementary- aged paleontologist with a terrific imagination, some disclaimers are in order.

First, my five year old loves the show and I enjoy watching it with him. The dinosaurs that come to life through Dan’s imagination are life-like and impressive. Second, my son has learned a lot about dinosaurs by watching the show, including the names of dozens of dinosaurs that I can’t begin to pronounce.

The fact is that Dan, the title character in the show, is a terrific model of manners, intelligence, and curiosity. He shows great respect for his mom and his teachers and strives to treat other children well; all characteristics I want for my son. Outside of some minor conflicts with his annoying little brother, Trek, Dan is a great role model for any child.

Given what I think of the show, I was saddened by the realization (after watching more than a few episodes, I might add) that Dino Dan is perpetuating one of the most destructive myths in western culture. On full display in each episode is the myth that fathers are unnecessary when it comes to raising children. The fact that Dan apparently has a very busy paleontologist father is little consolation since he is virtually absent from the child’s life.

Granted, the Canadian culture that produces Dino Dan must deal with the reality that in provinces like Quebec, most kids are being born to single mothers. Given that fact and to cater to the politically correct, maybe showing that a single mom can raise a well-adjusted child is warranted. However, my objection to the show’s portrayal of Dan’s fatherless home is not based on the desire to have single-parent homes unrepresented in the world of children’s television.

My primary objection to Dino Dan is in how thoroughly the show’s creators have scrubbed it of any meaningful reference to Dan’s globe-trotting father. And they’ve gone about it in a way that, I’m sure, they consider balanced for the 21st Century.

In place of his father, the writers of the show have given Dan a mother with (surprisingly) stereotypical masculine traits. She’s a police officer, a martial arts expert, and a disciplinarian. What’s conveyed is the message that all it really takes to effectively replace a father is to take a mom and give her a black belt and a gun.

Unfortunately for the creators of Dino Dan, the sociological evidence says otherwise. Social scientists are beginning to confirm what we knew from experience all along: fathers are just as important to raising well-adjusted, emotionally secure, and happy children as are mothers. And they matter to boys and girls in equally important, but different, ways.

For both, self-worth and confidence are largely learned at the hands of fathers. For girls, good fathers bestow the knowledge that they are seen as beautiful and loved unconditionally by at least one man on earth – with no strings attached. For boys, good fathers provide an example of how a man ought to care for his family and community, and – importantly – how men should treat the women in their lives.

Strong mothers, like Dan’s, can do a lot to mitigate the loss or the absence of a father – I know because my mother did a good job of that for me – but they can never fully replace the father who isn’t there. And it doesn’t help for shows like Dino Dan to perpetuate the myth that they can. Just as many TV shows and advertising wrongfully portray men (and especially fathers) as alternatively clueless and bungling, Dino Dan wrongfully promotes the view that fathers simply don’t matter to a child’s well-being.

My hope is that in some future edition of Dino Dan, the importance of fathers will be acknowledged – not just because fathers do matter but because I fear that there are children seeing the show who may be learning that father absence is an acceptable norm – and an inconsequential one at that.

Religious Freedom and the Regulatory State Yet Again

December 1st, 2011 by Joseph M. Knippenberg
Share |

About six weeks ago, I posted on this topic, referring then to a case the Supreme Court had taken up.  Then the issue was whether and to what extent government employment regulations governed the relationship between churches and other faith-based organizations and their employees.  Now, the issue—taken up in an administrative rather than a judicial context—is what sort of health insurance coverage religious employers have to offer.  The larger question remains, as always, how a religious organization can remain faithful to its mission and its understanding of its responsibilities when government is assuming an ever greater responsibility for governing varying aspects of our lives.

You may have heard about the so-called “contraceptive mandate,” which follows from the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) and requires  employers that provide health insurance for their employees to offer a range of contraceptive programs, including some abortifacient drugs.   I discussed it here: there is a very limited exemption  for some religious employers, but it doesn’t extend to organizations (like the Georgia Family Council, the Salvation Army, or a denominationally-sponsored hospital) that engage in significant public outreach or service.

My friend Rick Garnett, a law professor at Notre Dame, has authored an op-ed that I wish could be the last word on the subject.  Herewith a few excerpts:

[G]overnments hoping to make good on Madison’s promise will sometimes accommodate religious believers and groups by exempting them from rules and requirements. This sounds like special treatment for religion, and indeed it is. Our country’s founders believed that such compromises are sometimes necessary and justified, even when the rules in question are popular or seem sensible, because religious freedom is both fundamental and vulnerable….

A more generous exemption for religious employers — indeed, the elimination of the mandate itself — would not hamstring the aims of the new health care law because nearly all employer-based insurance plans already cover prescription contraceptives. The belief that drug-induced abortion is wrong and should not be publicly subsidized is deeply and widely held, by people on all sides of the health care debate. This is not an instance in which religious believers are asking the community to compromise a core shared value, to impose harms on third parties, or to endorse an offensive or dangerous view.

It is easy to respect and protect religious liberty if everyone agrees or if governments do very little. The American situation, of course, is different. When more active governments, like ours, direct a religiously diverse citizenry, like ours, there is going to be tension and conflict, trade-offs and compromise.

Given our deep-rooted commitment to religious freedom, our goal should be to resolve this conflict in a way that does not make the radical privatization of faith the price of acting consistently with that faith.

Amen, brother, amen.  If we had a small government that took on very few responsibilities, religion could well prosper in the space left open for voluntary community activity.  But, as I said above, the farther government reaches, the more it potentially trenches on the freedom of religious groups to be faithful to their missions.  In our day and age, religious freedom requires accommodation, which looks like special treatment, but really is just governmental self-restraint.  Even if it doesn’t require this accommodation or self-restrain, the First Amendment certainly permits it.  And we voters and supporters of religious organizations and religious freedom should insist upon it.

Looming Population Decline?

November 3rd, 2011 by Eric Cochling
Share |

For those concerned about overpopulation, news that we’ve surpassed seven billion people on the planet may seem like additional cause for alarm. However, if you dig into the numbers, you find that dramatic population decline may be just over the horizon in many parts of the world given current trends – and “developed” countries are likely to be hardest hit.

This article points out that in countries like India and China, where you might think population growth is very strong, the reality is much different. This is particularly true for China, where a government enforced one-child policy has decimated the young female population and contributed to the aging and elderly becoming the fastest growing demographic – not an enviable position for any country to be in.

While fertility rates in the US remain slightly above the replacement rate of 2.1, the decline in fertility continues here much as it does across the industrialized world, where most countries are facing a dramatic fertility decline.

In this interview, Brad Wilcox, Director of the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia, points out that while lower fertility rates may have a short-term positive impact on the economy (because adults are free to work harder in the economy instead of raising children), the long term impact is a different story:

In the short term, this demographic dividend can work out brilliantly, as the East Asian miracle attests. But in the long term, this dividend can turn into a demographic liability as birth rates fall well below replacement and a society ceases to produce enough people to work in the economy and pay for the welfare state. This is what is now happening in Japan, and a similar fate may befall other leading economies in the region — from Taiwan to South Korea.

The phenomenon that Wilcox describes can be seen in the US baby boom following World War II that preceded the economic surge in the US economy during the 1980s and 90s. At the same time as the Baby Boomers entered their most productive economic years, they were also having far fewer children than their parents did, leaving much more time for the careers that were driving the economy. Unfortunately (or fortunately, depending on your view of things), the Boomers set in motion a general fertility decline in the US that continues until today.

Wilcox goes on to point out that the current pressures on major government programs in the US (like Medicare and Social Security) are largely the result of that fertility decline. At this point we have far fewer people paying into these programs (relative to beneficiaries) than we once did, which is impacting their solvency. As fertility rates decline further, the pressure will only grow worse unless the programs are changed significantly to reduce the benefits offered or the number of people who qualify.

While increasing the US fertility rate is also a solution, it’s difficult to imagine reversing our current trajectory. Our culture has come to value personal autonomy and career advancement above the duties required of child bearing. While we’re still having children, we’re waiting much longer to have them (roughly five years later on average than in the 1970s) and when we do start having children, we have considerably fewer than our grandparents did.

Indeed, it seems that we’re approaching a crossroads where the perceived short-term personal benefit of having fewer children will have to be reconciled with the reality of a long-term declining and less prosperous nation as a whole.

My hope is that we can reconcile the competing views before the situation becomes dire. And, when we do, I hope we come down on the side of more human life rather than less.

Occupy Atlanta and Representative Government

November 2nd, 2011 by Joseph M. Knippenberg
Share |

I have been following the Occupy movements with some interest, especially since the Occupiers criticize, among other things, the “unrepresentative” character of American government in the name of the 99% (of which I am one small, insignificant part).

Occupy Atlanta garnered all sorts of national publicity when the city’s mayor, Kasim Reed, decided that the time had come to evict the Occupiers from Woodruff Park.  Some noted the apparent irony of an African-American mayor, who was in some sense the heir of a successful civil rights movement, ordering the police to take action against those who were “sitting in” on behalf of the rights they claimed.  Here’s how one protest spokeswoman put it:

Group spokeswoman La’ Die Mansfield said at an 11 a.m. press conference that they are a group dedicated to “peaceful and lawful protest and we will continue to do so.”

“We are an occupying protest, so we are going to continue to occupy Atlanta,” she said.

State Senator Vincent Fort, arrested along with the Occupiers, had this to say:

“He’s using all these resources … This is the most peaceful place in Georgia,” Fort said, referring to Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed. “At the urging of the business community, he’s moving people out. Shame on him.”

I, on the other hand, think it was a great act of forbearance for the mayor to leave Woodruff Park “occupied” for so long.  People do indeed have a First Amendment right to protest, but the Supreme Court has long recognized that these rights are subject to neutral “time, place, and manner” regulations.  A rule is a rule is a rule, and there was no reason not to enforce it against Occupy Atlanta.  Living in a decent society requires that we treat one another civilly, even as we disagree.  Rules prohibiting the kind of occupation we experienced over the past few weeks are intended to protect that civility and mutual respect.

Now, the Occupiers might respond that the rules are made at the behest of and on behalf of the 1%, while they speak for the 99%,  Consider this strident critique of Kasim Reed and, indeed, of all of his predecessors in the mayor’s office:

Nobody should doubt that Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed is firmly in the pocket of the one percent. It’s old news. It’s a choice he and leaders of the local black misleadership class made more than a generation ago. The clique of black political leaders who came to power with Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson in 1973, and who still hold sway today, have never been friends or advocates of black or white working people. Though they owed, and still owe their offices, careers and personal fortunes to the political victories won by the Freedom Movement, Atlanta’s black misleadership class has rarely, if ever, lined up with black and working people when it came to economic justice….

The current mayor is firmly within the tradition of his predecessors. Kasim Reed is a corporate lawyer for the rich and racist, a man who has never fought for, or believed in, justice for ordinary people.

The problem, of course, is that the current spokesmen for the 99% are self-appointed.  No one elected them; they just showed up and made claims on behalf of a group defined by nothing other than its relative wealth.  As I said earlier, I’m part of the 99% and they most certainly don’t speak for me.

Of course this claim is just a rhetorical device.  They simply aspire to rally as many people as they can against the very wealthy, who are said to dominate the political system.   But in making the claim, they raise and very inadequately answer an interesting question: our government is supposed to operate in accordance with a system of representation, but if, as they say, it doesn’t work, what are we supposed to do?  Many of us actually voted for our current officeholders, or at least participated in elections where they were chosen.  Are our votes illegitimate because we’re victims of “false consciousness” or because our choices were conditioned by the resources of the very wealthy?  The Occupiers would seem to think so.  But, as I said, they seem to have appointed themselves.  They can be “legitimate” only if they speak “more authentically” for “the people.”

Needless to say, such a claim is even more problematical than any election in which I’ve ever participated.  It throws out the possibility of any sort of selection procedure in which “the people’ are actually consulted.  Instead, we’d have as our representatives those who know better than we do what’s good for us.

Thanks, but no thanks.  “Democracy,” Winston Churchill is said to have said, “is the worst form of government…except for all the others.”  Amen to that.

The Global Financial Crisis: A Religious Perspective

October 25th, 2011 by Joseph M. Knippenberg
Share |

Because the Roman Catholic Church has a longer and more distinguished tradition of serious reflection on social, political, and economic issues than does any other Christian denomination, and because its statements are influential even among non-Catholics, the recent “Note on Reform of the International Financial and Monetary Systems in the Context of Global Public Authority” from the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace is worth a careful examination.

Early reactions to the document fall along more or less predictable lines.  According to the New York Times, one liberal Catholic theologian was quick to identify the Church’s teaching with the Occupy Wall Street movement:

“It’s clear the Vatican stands with the Occupy Wall Street protesters and others struggling to return ethics and good governance to a financial sector grown out of control after 30 years of deregulation.”

Others are more critical of the document, observing, first, that its principles don’t stray from traditional Catholic social teaching and, second, that its analysis hews closely to conventional economic thinking.

From my point of view (closer to the latter than to the former reaction), the Note’s most compelling passages invoke the first principles of Roman Catholic social teaching and its least compelling passages attempt to show how those principles can be put into practice.  The document contains a critique of liberal individualism for which I have a great deal of sympathy:

What has driven the world in such a problematic direction for its economy and also for peace?

First and foremost, an economic liberalism that spurns rules and controls. Economic liberalism is a theoretical system of thought, a form of “economic apriorism” that purports to derive laws for how markets function from theory, these being laws of capitalistic development, while exaggerating certain aspects of markets. An economic system of thought that sets down a priori the laws of market functioning and economic development, without measuring them against reality, runs the risk of becoming an instrument subordinated to the interests of the countries that effectively enjoy a position of economic and financial advantage.…

In his social encyclical, Benedict XVI precisely identified the roots of a crisis that is not only economic and financial but above all moral in nature. In fact, as the Pontiff notes, to function correctly the economy needs ethics; and not just of any kind but one that is people-centred. He goes on to denounce the role played by utilitarianism and individualism and the responsibilities of those who have adopted and promoted them as the parameters for the optimal behaviour of all economic and political agents who operate and interact in the social context….

Recognizing the primacy of being over having and of ethics over the economy, the world’s peoples ought to adopt an ethic of solidarity as the animating core of their action. This implies abandoning all forms of petty selfishness and embracing the logic of the global common good which transcends merely contingent, particular interests. In a word, they ought to have a keen sense of belonging to the human family which means sharing the common dignity of all human beings: “Even prior to the logic of a fair exchange of goods and the forms of justice appropriate to it, there exists something which is due to man because he is man, by reason of his lofty dignity.”

In 1991, after the failure of Marxist communism, Blessed John Paul II had already warned of the risk of an “idolatry of the market, an idolatry which ignores the existence of goods which by their nature are not and cannot be mere commodities.” Today his warning needs to be heeded without delay and a road must be taken that is in greater harmony with the dignity and transcendent vocation of the person and the human family.

At the level of prophetic witness, I’m happy to embrace this not-quite-ringing reminder of our common humanity, of the primacy of the human good, and of the nature of the market as one among many mere instruments for the promotion of human flourishing.  There is a created moral order to which we all belong.

Where I hesitate is endorsing the call for global political institutions to regulate that universal moral order.  Perhaps it’s my Protestant emphasis on our sinfulness and fallibility that leads me to worry about giving power to institutions that are so distant from the ordinary levers of human control.  Or perhaps it’s my experience of the United Nations, hardly an encouraging example of political and fiscal self-restraint and modulated moral judgment.

To be sure, the Vatican document is replete with calls for gradualism in the establishment of this new international institution and invocations of the traditional Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity, of leaving responsibility to the level of authority that is closest to the people who are to be served.  Perhaps in practice there’s no difference between the Vatican’s recommendations and my hesitations.

But, considering this passage, I doubt it:

Paul VI emphasized the revolutionary power of “forward-looking imagination” that can perceive the possibilities inscribed in the present and guide people towards a new future. By freeing his imagination, man frees his existence. Through an effort of community imagination, it is possible to transform not only institutions but also lifestyles and encourage a better future for all peoples.Modern States became structured wholes over time and reinforced sovereignty within their own territory. But social, cultural and political conditions have gradually changed. Their interdependence has grown – so it has become natural to think of an international community that is integrated and increasingly ruled by a shared system – but a worse form of nationalism has lingered on, according to which the State feels it can achieve the good of its own citizens in a self-sufficient way.

Today all of this seems anachronistic and surreal, and all the nations, great or small, together with their governments, are called to go beyond the “state of nature” which would keep States in a never-ending struggle with one another. Globalization, despite some of its negative aspects, is unifying peoples more and prompting them to move towards a new “rule of law” on the supranational level, supported by a more intense and fruitful collaboration. With dynamics similar to those that put an end in the past to the “anarchical” struggle between rival clans and kingdoms with regard to the creation of national states, today humanity needs to be committed to the transition from a situation of archaic struggles between national entities, to a new model of a more cohesive, polyarchic international society that respects every people’s identity within the multifaceted riches of a single humanity. Such a passage, which is already timidly under way, would ensure the citizens of all countries – regardless of their size or power – peace and security, development, and free, stable and transparent markets. As John Paul II warns us, “Just as the time has finally come when in individual States a system of private vendetta and reprisal has given way to the rule of law, so too a similar step forward is now urgently needed in the international community.”Time has come to conceive of institutions with universal competence, now that vital goods shared by the entire human family are at stake, goods which the individual States cannot promote and protect by themselves.

My worry about these supranational institutions is that they are irresponsible in both the political and the moral sense.  The “masters of the universe” (Tom Wolfe’s phrase) who populate them are little different from the Wall Street financiers it is so easy now to deprecate.  And, I fear, the more cosmopolitan they are, the less rooted they will be in any genuine community that can call them to account.  If we genuinely care about character, virtue, and responsibility, we have to ask which institutions are most likely to serve as their seedbeds.

The answer, I’d bet, is that there’s generally an inverse relationship between size and scope, on the one side, and success in cultivating character, on the other.  Edmund Burke’s little platoons would be likeliest to be the most morally salubrious.  We should look to families, churches, and local communities to promote human decency and, with it, human flourishing.  Perhaps if we got that right, we could begin to have some confidence in the supranational institutions.  Or perhaps if we got that right, we’d have less need of them.